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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Based on semantic judgements concerning the attractiveness of available alterna-
tives, MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation
Technique, see [1], [2], and www.m-macbeth.com) is an interactive approach to
quantify the attractiveness to a given party or agent of each alternative, in such
a way that the measurement scale constructed is an interval scale. In this pa-
per, we present an application of the MACBETH approach ([1], [2]) to a model
of coalition formation ([3]). The main concept of the model presented in [3] is
the concept of a stable government, where a government is defined as a pair
consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition.
We apply the MACBETH technique to quantify the attractiveness and re-
pulsiveness of possible governments to parties. We use this method to calculate
the utilities (the values) of governments to parties.
Let N be the set of all parties. There areM ≥ 1 independent policy issues on
which a government will have to decide. Let P and Pj denote a policy space and
a policy sub-space on issue j, respectively. A policy is represented by a tuple
p = (p1, ..., pM ) ∈ P , where each pj ∈ Pj is a policy on issue j. A majority
coalition will be denoted by pM+1, and the set of all majority coalitions will
be denoted by PM+1. A government is a pair g = (p, pM+1) consisting of a
majority coalition pM+1 ∈ PM+1 and a policy p = (p1, ..., pM ) ∈ P proposed
by this coalition. A stable government is defined as a government which is not
dominated by any other feasible government (see [3]).
In the present model, each party is assumed to have preferences regarding all
governments with respect to certain criteria. The criteria are the policy issues
and an ‘extra’ issue: ‘majority coalition’. Let C∗ be the set of all criteria, that is,
C∗ = {1, ...,M,M +1}, where criterion M +1 concerns the ‘majority coalition’.
For each j ∈ C∗, each party orders all policies on issue j taking into account the
attractiveness of these policies on the given issue. For each issue j, each party is
2asked to specify two particular references: neutral, defined as ‘neither satisfying
nor unsatisfying’, and good, which is more attractive to a party than neutral,
and is defined as ‘undoubtedly satisfying’. A neutral policy on issue j for party
i is denoted by pi,0j , and a good policy on issue j for party i is denoted by p
i,∗
j .
For each j ∈ C∗ and i ∈ N , based on references pi,0j and pi,∗j , we distinguish:
- an unattractive (or repulsive) policy on issue j to party i if it is less attractive
to i than pi,0j
- an attractive (or simply attractive) policy on issue j to party i if it is more
attractive to i than pi,0j
- a very attractive (or outstanding) policy on issue j to party i if it is at least as
attractive to i than pi,∗j .
For each criterion j ∈ C∗, each party i ∈ N is asked to verbally judge the
difference of attractiveness between each two policies on issue j, pj and p′j ,
where pj is at least as attractive to i as p′j . When judging, a party has to choose
one of the following categories:
C0 - no difference of attractiveness
C1 - very weak difference of attractiveness
C2 - weak difference of attractiveness
C3 - moderate difference of attractiveness
C4 - strong difference of attractiveness
C5 - very strong difference of attractiveness
C6 - extreme difference of attractiveness.
For each criterion j ∈ C∗, each party i ∈ N orders all policies on issue j
from the best one, denoted by pi,1j , to the worst one, denoted by p
i,|Pj |
j . Let
U ij(pj) denote the value of policy pj ∈ Pj on issue j ∈ C∗ to party i ∈ N . Let
K = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. We apply MACBETH to find the values of the policies on
issues which satisfy the following rules (see, for instance, [1]):
∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ C∗ ∀pj , p′j ∈ Pj :
U ij(pj) > U
i
j(p
′
j) ⇔ pj is more attractive to i than p′j (1)
∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ C∗ ∀k, k′ ∈ K ∀pj , p′j , p′′j , p′′′j ∈ Pj with (pj , p′j) ∈ Ck and
(p′′j , p
′′′
j ) ∈ Ck′ : k ≥ k′ + 1 ⇒ U ij(pj)− U ij(p′j) > U ij(p′′j )− U ij(p′′′j ) (2)
If rules (1) and (2) are satisfied, which means that the matrix of judgements
is consistent, then the software determines, from all the possible scales, a par-
ticular scale (called the MACBETH basic scale) by a procedure which consists
essentially of solving a certain linear programme. For each i ∈ N and j ∈ C∗,
the objective function in this programme is minU ij(p
i,1
j ) under the following
constraints:
U ij(p
i,|Pj |
j ) = 0 (3)
∀pj , p′j ∈ Pj with (pj , p′j) ∈ C0 : U ij(pj) = U ij(p′j) (4)
3∀k, k′ ∈ K ∪ {0} with k > k′, ∀(pj , p′j) ∈ Ck ∀(p′′j , p′′′j ) ∈ Ck′ :
U ij(pj)− U ij(p′j) ≥ U ij(p′′j )− U ij(p′′′j ) + k − k′ (5)
If it is impossible to satisfy rules (1) and (2), then no interval scale can represent
the judgements expressed. The matrix of judgements is then not consistent, and
a message appears on the screen (‘inconsistent judgements’) inviting the party to
revise its judgements. The MACBETH software warns the party and shows the
way(s) to obtain a cardinally consistent matrix of judgements. When having the
MACBETH basic scale calculated, we can also transform it (into the MACBETH
transformed scale), assigning value 0 to a neutral policy pi,0j on issue j ∈ C∗ and,
for instance, value 100 to a good policy pi,∗j on issue j, for party i ∈ N . The
basic MACBETH scale and each transformed MACBETH scale are still a pre-
cardinal scale. In order to obtain a cardinal scale, a discussion with the party
in question around the scale takes place. When a party thinks that finally the
scale adequately represents the relative magnitude of the judgements, we have
the cardinal scale and the (final) values of all policies on the given issue.
Let V ij (pj) denote the (final) value of policy pj ∈ Pj on issue j ∈ C∗ to party
i ∈ N . We assume then
∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ C∗ : V ij (pi,∗j ) = 100 and V ij (pi,0j ) = 0. (6)
Moreover, we get negative values for all repulsive policies on issue j ∈ C∗ to party
i, and values greater than 100 for all outstanding policies on issue j to party i.
Finally, we want to measure the global attractiveness of each government, that
is, the attractiveness of each government taking all criteria into account. We
adopt the following aggregation procedure:
V i(g) = V i(p1, ..., pM , pM+1) =
M+1∑
j=1
αij · V ij (pj), (7)
with αi1, ..., α
i
M+1 ≥ 0, and
M+1∑
j=1
αij = 1. (8)
In a similar way as in the case of policies on a given issue, we may apply the
MACBETH software to calculate the scaling constants (αij)j∈C∗ , where α
i
j is
called the weight of criterion j ∈ C∗ to party i ∈ N . Finally, using the aggrega-
tion procedure given in (7), one may calculate the values of all governments to
each party and identify stable governments if there are any.
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